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The wireless sensor-cloud networks (WSCNs) are becoming popular nowadays. The new concept of trust has emerged in recent
studies as an alternative mechanism to address the security concern in WSCN. Most of the studies on trust are focusing on how to
model and evaluate trust so as to effectively detect anymalicious activity in the network and then isolate and avoid them. In addition,
WSCNs are very dynamic and flexible, thus being hard to keep a static network topology and connectivity which bring more
challenges to be secured. In this paper, we have introduced the new angle of adaptive network approach to discover the interplay
between network node’s trust evaluation and its underlying topology change. It has been found that the network connectivity change
will also have strong impact on the trust behavior running over it.Moreover, inspired from the trust studies in sociology, we propose
that the Simmelian tie structured networks enable more positive impact on fostering trustworthiness among wireless sensor nodes,
but the structural hole characterized networks provide more opportunity for misbehaviors and have negative impact on securing
the sensor-cloud networks. The extensive simulation studies have confirmed our new concepts and validated our hypothesis
1. Introduction
The rapid growth in Information and Communication Tech-
nologies (ICT) makes many network applications become
feasible. One of the popular applications today is Internet
of Things (IoT) and it is becoming the emerging paradigm
of the future Internet [1]. Wireless Sensor Network (WSN)
is one of pillar stones to enable IoT [2]. WSN is composed
of sensor nodes and they are connected wirelessly without
a static network topology, and this makes the WSN become
flexible and easy to be deployed in various environments
according to the different applications.WSN is normally used
as sensor monitor network such as security, military sensing,
and intelligent environment monitoring [3].
Cloud computing is a popular concept nowadays that it
is a model for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand
network access to a shared pool of configurable computing
resources [4]. So as to be able to fully exploit its power,
a seamlessly integration with our physical life is necessary
[5]. As mentioned before, WSNs can seamlessly integrate
the digital world with physical world that the integration
of WSN and cloud computing which is also named Wire-
less Sensor-Cloud Network (WSCN) is becoming popular
nowadays [5–7]. The sensors in the networks are collecting
data and transmitting them to the backend cloud servers,
and the cloud is enabled with graphic user interface (GUI)
and visualization tools to easily allow users to query, store,
and analyse the data without requiring any knowledge of the
backend [7].
On the other hand, each sensor inWSCN is self-organised
and connected with control center by using wireless con-
nection, sensor exposition in an open environment, and
so forth. All these features of WSCN make the network
entities and their information flows easily accessed by the
malicious parties. The security issues are crucial in WSCN
environment. Compared to the traditional cable network,
the computing resources such as capacity, processing, and
battery are limited in sensor nodes in WSCN; the traditional
security mechanisms such as heavy computing oriented
encryption mechanism need to be tailored to apply on this
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situation. Moreover, as WSCN is self-organized distributed
network the traditional trust infrastructure such as Public
Key Infrastructure (PKI) is no longer suitable.Thedistributed
trust management is a popular solution for this nowadays.
Each node in the WSCN is an independent entity to evaluate
its neighbors on trust by their previous interactive experience
and indirect reputation from other nodes. It normally selects
the neighbor node with highest trustworthiness to forward
data to the destination [8–13].
In this paper, we are interested in discovering how the
underlying network topology can affect the overlay trust
behavior in a WSCN. The rest of the paper is organized as
follows. Section 2 reviews the definition of trust in different
disciplines, the state of art of distributed trust and reputation
management research, adaptive networks, and the pillar stone
structural concepts of Simmelian tie and structural hole in
sociology. The metrics such as clustering coefficient and
effective size are introduced to characterize and measure the
Simmelian tie and structural hole in Section 3. A trust and
reputation evaluation algorithm for end-to-end routing in
WSCN, as a model of overlay trust behavior, has been pro-
posed in Section 4. Section 5 has conducted two simulation
case studies to discover how the Simmelian tie and structural
hole affect trust evaluation behavior regarding malicious
attacks. Finally in Section 6 we conclude the significant
findings and also lay out the future works.
2. Related Works
The traditional security mechanisms such as cryptography
are mainly focused on providing data integrity, confiden-
tiality, access control, node authentication, and so forth.
All these can make sure that the nodes in the network are
well protected from malicious parties from outside, but it is
not very effective to protect against the malicious activities
from inside. For example, legitimate nodes in the network
behave selfishly that they refuse to forward packets (black-
hole attack) or some of the packets (grey-hole attack). In such
situation, the distributed trust management system is a more
effective way to protect the network availability.
2.1. Trust Definition. Trust is a very important factor in our
everyday life as all relationships rely on the trust in the human
society, and each interaction with other people involves trust
as well. The study in [14] has described the formation of
human friendship as ego observes his own behavior and
that of alters during the interaction and evaluates this in
terms of his own values, norms, interests, and so forth.
The ego pays attention not only to interaction in which he
plays part by himself, but also to interaction among alters.
The more information ego has collected about all alters,
the more reliable not only ego’s estimation of the suitability
of alters in terms of continuation of the relationship, but
also his estimation of the willingness of alters to reciprocate
his personal interest. If alters have positive match of ego’s
expectation, ego will invest more time and effort to interact
with these alters so as to enable these friendly relationships
becoming more reliable friendship. The study [15] suggested
if the ego has more trust alters in the past, then he will more
likely trust more in the present, and vice versa. Also, if the
ego hears more trust from 3rd party about alters, it has more
trust in alters as well. But when the ego hears distrust from
3rd party, it will have more impact than the impact of good
reputation from 3rd party. These two studies have implied
that human relationship is building on trust which is based
on the previous direct interaction and also indirect reputation
from 3rd parties.
Trust is important not only in the human society, but
also in the computer security area. Taking the public key
cryptography as an example, it requires the key that can only
be accessed by the authorized person; otherwise this security
mechanism becomes compromised which involves the trust
in both sides of the communications.
2.2. Modelling Trust in Computer Network. Trust in com-
puter world can be interpreted as the expectation of other
machines’ performance and being without malicious attacks,
and also this expectation will become the experience shared
through networks of machines [16, 17]. We can simply
translate this definition into two metrics which are direct
trust and indirect trust (i.e., reputation or recommendation).
Direct trust is the direct experiencewith target and reputation
is the comments from neighbors about the target. Many
studies on trust in computing are including these twometrics
to measure the trust. Moreover, the paper [18] suggested
that there are 3 dimensions in the trust which are originator
(trustor), purpose (e.g., trust in math, but not in writing),
and target (trustee). For the purpose that they think different
cases will have different purposes, trust should be evaluated
based on these different purposes. For example, the paper
[8] is using direct trust, recommendation, incentive function,
and active degree on the nodes to measure the trust; and the
paper [9] uses communication trust, data trust, and energy
trust that in communication trust has direct trust and indirect
trust; and the papers [10–13] all have different purposes
and metrics, but they both use the direct trust and indirect
trust metrics. There are two popular ways to combine the
metrics in current trust algorithms which are using weight
factors in [13] and fuzzy logic in [19]. The studies [11, 20]
have tried something different and they select some of the
powerful nodes as trust nodes to perform trust evaluation
on the rest. The rest of the nodes are only collecting trust
evidences rather than evaluating each other. All these studies
are focusing on how to effective measure trust so as to avoid
any malicious activity in the network, but none of them is
discussing how the overlay trust evaluation and underlying
network topology can affect and interplay with each other.
The paper [21] proposed a trust-based routing protocol but
more focused on the network topologies control.Thenodes in
the network are self-organized to form many 3-node triangle
trust groups, so the network becomes of 2-level hierarchy in
order to reduce traffic transmission overhead and delay. It
is only focused on how the trust can affect the evolution of
network topology, but it has not considered, on the other side,
how the network topology change can affect the performance
of the trust algorithm. As the density of nodes in the network
increases, the triangle trust groups can become ineffective.
In a dense network, a node with more than 3 neighbors that
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the triangle structure can make the packet travel hops’ count
distance increase.
2.3. Trust in Cloud Computing. In [22], the trust has been
defined as “a positive expectation or assumption on future
outcomes that results from proven contextualized personal
interaction-histories corresponding to conventional relation-
ship types. It can be leveraged by formal and informal rules
and conventions within a Social Cloud to facilitate as well as
influence the scope of collaborative exchange.” The study in
[23] suggests that as users cannot see what is behind the cloud
service providers, so building up a trust requires the 3rd party
organization to audit and rate the cloud service providers.
The research in [7] proposed a trust-based algorithm under
a cloud-integrated Wireless Sensor Network which has three
subsystems which include sensors, network, and cloud-based
data servers. It suggested that, in the trust algorithm, the
trust should increase slowly with good behaviors but decrease
fast with dissatisfied behaviors so as to ensure detecting the
malicious activities as fast as possible. They also suggested
that the users have more trust in the cloud service provider
who can provide more security mechanisms to their servers,
access control, and transparent data process activities. These
indicate that the trust is building on the knowledge of target
and the approaches they have used to protect users’ security.
Overall, the current research studies on distributed trust
and reputation management are mainly focusing on how
to effectively model and measure trust so as to best detect
any malicious activity in the network, but there is no work
discussing how the underlying topology change can affect
the overlay trust behaviors. This steers our motivation to
pave a new direction in the field of trust management
in computer networks by exploring the novel concept of
adaptive networks.
2.4. Adaptive Network. Adaptive network is a novel combi-
nation of two concepts which are dynamics on networks and
dynamics of networks [24–26]. The dynamics on networks is
defined as the status change on the network service running
over the network such as network performance metrics of
Quality of Service (QoS), but the dynamics of networks is
defined as the change of the underlying network topological
connectivity. There is actually an interplay between them
which is termed the coevolution of networks. The study in
[24] has explored how the Internet web state or behavior
change can affect the underlying topologies, as well as how
the underlying network connectivity change can impact the
overlay Internet service state change. For example, if the users
change their behaviors to conduct more online shopping
this could cause more online shops (i.e., web servers) being
established to be linked to the Internet and more network
connectivity should be built. On the other hand, the website
position in search results could affect user’s preference to
access content; this is how topologies affect state.
The studies in [27, 28] have discovered the rewiring issues
to study how topology change can affect the state of nodes in
the network.The research questions are normally as “where to
add a link or node can best increase network performance?”
as well as “where to remove a link in the network can result
maximum reduction of network performance?” It has been
found in [28] that adding a link between two weak connected
nodes will result in most increase in network robustness and
that removing a link between two strong connected vertices
can have least reduction in network robustness. The studies
in [29–31] have identified some effective metrics to measure
network robustness. Here the network robustness is defined
as the survivability of the network when it is under attack
or major failure occurred. The effective metrics to measure
network robustness are algebraic connectivity, betweenness,
clustering coefficient, and effective resistance. Betweenness
is to find out the centrality of the node in the network,
and the clustering coefficient is to find out the percentage
of clusters out of the maximum number of possible clusters
that can be formed in the network. When calculating the
clustering coefficient, it is to use a close triad network
structure as a cluster which is called as Simmelian triad in
the sociology. In sociology, the study in [32] has suggested
that the Simmelian tie has positive effect on increasing the
effectiveness of interdependent tasks, but the structural hole
has negative effect on the effectiveness of interdependent
tasks. The trust based routing in WSCN, in other words, a
sensor node, is sending the collected information to the cloud
center to process by routing through others nodes. This can
be considered as an interdependent task (i.e., to form an end-
to-end path) in WSCN. Therefore we can have the following
hypotheses to be validated:
(1) Simmelian tie characterized network structure has
positive effect on fostering trustworthiness among
wireless sensor nodes and can ensure amore trustable
network structure for end-to-end communications
service.
(2) On the other hand, the structural hole characterized
network structure has negative effect on fostering
trustworthiness and it provides high opportunity for
misbehavior by node itself or easily becomes the
target to be attacked by malicious nodes and is in a
risk as being less trustable network structure.
In the following section we will introduce the concepts
on Simmelian tie and also structural hole and how they are
related to the formulations of trustworthiness as well as their
related measurement.
3. Simmelian Tie versus Structural Hole and
Their Measurement
3.1. Simmelian Ties versus Structural Hole. Simmelian tie
[33] is defined as triad tie or closed structure tie that ties
embedded in the cliques as shown in Figure 1. In sociology,
it is believed that the Simmelian tie is stronger than other
regular strong ties between two actors as it discourages
misbehavior by introducing a third party to become “shadow
of the others” and “shadowof the future.”This strongly fosters
a normative environment against opportunist and engenders
mutual trust, reciprocity norms, and shared identity. It
facilitates the collaborative efforts by making the actors more
willing to exchange information among themselves.
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Figure 1: Simmelian ties versus structural hole.
On the other hand, the structural hole [34] is an actor
connecting between two or more actors or parties who are
not related or connected. It is opposite to the close structure
of Simmelian tie, and it is an open structure tie as shown in
Figure 1. In such case, this actor normally act as broker or
gatekeeper which has positioning advantage to control the
information flows among the networks. It plays a very critical
role that once it is broken then the whole network is to be
disconnected.
In terms of the trustworthiness, the actor is located
in structure hole and is being positioned uniquely with
an advantage to control the information flow among the
network, which can provide the actor a fearless opportunity
to act unethically toward all other parties without fear of the
other person learning of his act. Being positioned in structure
hole, the actor becomes a gatekeeper of information that
might otherwise be transmitted between contacts. In addition
to the opportunity of withholding critical information, the
actor spans structural hole and may also have great oppor-
tunity to distort or terminate information flow that passes
through each party. Moreover, from the network attack point
of view, this actor is usually more attractive to be attacked
because its bottleneck position. Taking the network routing
as example, it means that there is no alternative route to be
selected and cannot avoid the malicious attack if the actor is
comprised or even itself has misbehavior.
The study in [35] suggested that the Simmelian tie can
be good in some case like the interdependent task which
requires teamwork and cooperation. It can also be negative
as it enforces the group behavior that limits the innovation
for the individual. On the other hand, the structural hole
is the same. It is good in individual task as actor can more
easily access the exclusive information from different parties
to better deliver the task while it also presents opportunities
for misconduct because when an individual spanning a
gap between otherwise unrelated contacts, this individual is
positioned to act unethically toward another individual or
group without fear of the other person learning of the act.
In the following, we are going to identify some metrics
for measuring the Simmelian tie and structural hole in the
network.
For the measurement of Simmelian ties in a network,
we first consider the undirected and unweight network as
a graph 𝐺(𝑁, 𝐿), where 𝑁 is the nodes set and 𝐿 is the
links set between nodes in 𝐺. As mentioned in Section 2, the
clustering coefficient is reported as the most suitable metric
for its measurement [29–31, 35]. In addition, the effective
size is reported as a suitable metric to detect structural hole
according to study in [35] as this metric can be used to detect
nonredundancy connection in the network.
3.2. Clustering Coefficient. Theclustering coefficient has been
calculated by using the following equation in most studies
[27–30]:
𝑐
𝑖
=
2
𝑛
𝑖
× (𝑛
𝑖
− 1)
× 𝑠
𝑖
. (1)
In (1), 𝑐
𝑖
is the clustering coefficient for node 𝑖 in network
𝐺, 𝑛
𝑖
is the number of neighbors of node 𝑖, and 𝑠
𝑖
is the
number of closed triples having been formed with node 𝑖.
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𝑖
× (𝑛
𝑖
− 1) is number of possible triples that can be formed
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𝑖
can be defined as follows:
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,
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are the connection links between nodes 𝑖 and 𝑗, 𝑖 and 𝑘,
and 𝑗 and 𝑘. If the connection between the nodes exists, then
𝑙 = 1; otherwise 𝑙 = 0. While node 𝑖 has less than 2 neighbors,
the clustering coefficient is 0. In such case, we can have the
equation below:
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For the whole network 𝐺, the average clustering coeffi-
cient can be used to measure the density of Simmelian ties.
The equation is as below:
𝐶
𝐺
=
∑
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑐
𝑖
𝑛
, (4)
where 𝐶
𝐺
is the average clustering coefficient for network 𝐺
and 𝑛 is the number of nodes in the network 𝐺.
3.3. Effective Size. The clustering coefficient measures the
redundant path in the network where the effective size is
in the opposite way that it measures the nonredundancy
connection in the network. In the study [35], the effective size
is defined as
𝐸
𝑖
= 𝑛
𝑖
−
1
𝑛
𝑖
𝑛𝑖
∑
𝑗=1
𝑛𝑖
∑
𝑘=1
𝑙
𝑖𝑗
𝑙
𝑖𝑘
𝑙
𝑗𝑘
, (5)
where 𝐸
𝑖
is the effective size for node 𝑖. Equation (3) can be
substituted into (5) and become
𝐸
𝑖
= 𝑛
𝑖
− (𝑛
𝑖
− 1) × 𝑐
𝑖
. (6)
As shown in Figure 2, we show how to calculate the clus-
tering coefficient and effective size for these three different
topologies. These network topologies have exactly the same
number of nodes and links. Taking node 3, for example, in
topology 𝐴, node 3 has 4 neighboring nodes, so 𝑛
3
= 4. In
addition, there are 3 closed triples associated with node 3,
so 𝑠
3
= 3, and 𝑐
3
= (2/(4 ∗ (4 − 1))) ∗ 3 = 1/2. Then we
have 𝑐
3
= (2/(3 ∗ (3 − 1))) ∗ 2 = 2/3 for topology 𝐵 and
𝑐
3
= (2/(4∗ (4−1)))∗3 = 1/2 for in topology𝐶, respectively.
For the average clustering coefficient, 𝐶
𝐴
= (1 + 2/3 + 1/2 +
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Figure 2:Three network topologieswith the samenode number and
connection number.
1 + 2/3)/5 = 3/4, 𝐶
𝐵
= (0 + 1/3 + 2/3 + 2/3 + 1/3)/5 = 2/5,
and 𝐶
𝐶
= (0 + 1 + 1/2 + 1 + 1) = 2/3. Regarding the
values of average clustering coefficient, topology 𝐴 has the
highest value and it has better network topology structure
too, as every node has Simmelian ties which can enforce the
trustworthiness and also quickly detect the misbehaved node
and find an alternative route.
In terms of effective sizes for node 3, they are 𝐸
3
= 4 −
(4− 1) ∗ 1/2 = 5/2 in network𝐴, 𝐸
3
= 3− (3 − 1) ∗ 2/3 = 5/3
in network 𝐵, and 𝐸
3
= 4 − (4 − 1) ∗ 1/2 = 5/2 in network
𝐶. It can be seen that the effective size for node 3 in networks
𝐴 and 𝐶 is the same, but node 3 in network 𝐶 is located as a
structural hole position. Obviously the effective size does not
effectively identify the structure hole where normally a node
with higher effective size value is more likely at a structural
hole position.
4. Trust-Based Geography Routing Algorithm
We have developed a trust-based geographical routingmodel
associated with trust threshold mechanism to validate our
hypothesis mentioned in the end of Section 2.This algorithm
can find the destination by geographical information effi-
ciently in large WSCN. It can filter out all the neighboring
nodes with trust value below the trust threshold and select
the best neighboring nodes as next hop from the remaining
qualified neighbors. Figure 3 shows the decision flow chart
for this algorithm.
It calculates trust value through direct trust and indirect
trust (i.e., reputation). The direct trust is the trust evaluation
performed by the trustor directly, while indirect trust is the
direct trust value fromother neighbors regarding the targeted
node. These indirect values can be combined to reach a final
trust value between 0 and 1 by using confidence factors. The
direct trust metric equation is as shown below:
𝑡direct =
𝑠
𝑠 + 𝑓
, (7)
where 𝑠 is the total number of good behaviors of target
node and 𝑓 is the total number of bad behaviors. In such
case, whenever the neighbors have malicious behaviors, this
routing algorithm can record them so as to decrease the trust
value.The indirect trust is the trust value obtained from other
neighbors who know the target node.The final trust value can
be calculated using the following equation:
𝑡final = 𝑐direct × 𝑡direct + (1 − 𝑐direct) × 𝑡indirect. (8)
There are also confident factors for direct trust and
indirect trust which is 𝑐direct in (8).The algorithm first sets up
an initial trust threshold value and also the maximum trust
threshold value ℎmax; the equation is shown as below:
ℎmax = (
∑
𝑛
𝑖
𝑡
𝑖
𝑛
) − 0.1. (9)
In (9), 𝑛 is the number of selected nodes with good
behavior, and 𝑡
𝑖
is the direct trust value. In such case,
this threshold can make sure that all the nodes with good
behavior are in the safe forwarding list. There is a chance that
some of the good nodes have bad performance by accident,
and the safe forwarding list size could be decreasing over
time. Moreover, sometimes the node can be surrounded
by malicious neighbors which can end up with an empty
safe forwarding list. In such case, the algorithm will make
sure that there are sufficient choices in the list and also
give second chance to the nodes having poor performance
previously to ensure the basic communications service.When
the threshold is equal to ℎmax and safe forwarding list size
is less than 30% of number of neighbors, threshold value
will drop by 0.1 so as to give second chance to those nodes
having bad performance before. If those nodes’ performance
becomes good again, their trust values should be increased
back to the standard level. If after the first decrease in
threshold value the safe forwarding list is still less than 30%,
then nothing is to happen until the list is empty.When the list
is empty, the algorithm will drop the threshold by 0.1 again
until the list is not empty any more.
After the safe forwarding list is generated, the distance
metric selects the neighbor with the shortest distance to the
destination as next hop from the list.The distance equation is
shown as below:
𝑑 = √
󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨𝑥𝑛 − 𝑥𝑑
󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨
2
+
󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨𝑦𝑛 − 𝑦𝑑
󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨
2
, (10)
where (𝑥
𝑛
, 𝑦
𝑛
) and (𝑥
𝑑
, 𝑦
𝑑
) are the longitude and latitude of
neighbor and destination.The algorithm selects the neighbor
from safe forwarding list with lowest distance 𝑑 as next hop
to forward the packets. But some nodes do not always have
neighbors on the direction to the sink. In such case, the study
in [36] has provided a solution called perimeter forwarding
which selects the first neighbor on the counter clockwise the
direction to sink, as shown in Figure 4.
In such case, the nodes switch between distance and
perimeter forwarding mode to ensure that the next hop
is properly determined. Moreover, no-cross heuristic was
suggested in [35] as well to support perimeter forwarding so
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Figure 3: The decision flow of the proposed trust-based routing model.
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Figure 4: An example of perimeter forwarding.
as to make sure that the packet is not travelling in loop by
using the Relative Neighborhood Graph (RNG) approach as
in Figure 5.
In RNG, if there is an edge existing between node 𝐴 and
node 𝐵, it should not have the third node 𝐶 in the grey area.
The circle indicates the wireless radio range for node 𝐴 and
𝐵. This mechanism is to ensure that the algorithm can find a
route to the destination if there is one.
5. Simulation Studies
The simulation studies have been conducted to validate our
hypothesis on the roles of Simmelian ties and structural hole
for fostering trustworthiness in sensor-cloud networks by
using J-Sim tool [37]. We are using the clustering coefficient
A
C
B
Figure 5: Relative Neighborhood Graph (RNG).
to differentiate the Simmelian ties amount in the network
and effective size to detect the structural hole. The higher
the clustering coefficient, the more Simmelian ties in the
network. In the same way, the higher the effective size is, the
more likely the node is structural hole.
5.1. First Case Study. First of all, we set up four network
topologies which all have 16 nodes and 26 links as shown in
Figures 6–9.
As shown in Figures 6–9, network 1 has nine Simmelian
triangles and network 2 has seven Simmelian triangles. Then
there are three Simmelian triangles in network 3, and network
4 has ten Simmelian triangles associated with two structural
holes (in nodes 10 and 6). The average clustering coefficients
for networks 1–4 are listed in Table 1. The value of clustering
coefficient is reflecting the number of Simmelian triangles in
network where network 4 has the highest and network 3 has
the smallest coefficient.
We are using the trust-based routing algorithm intro-
duced in Section 4 to validate our hypothesis. For each
network, we basically set up three traffic demands from node
1 to node 16, node 2 to node 14, and node 3 to node 13. The
packets are being sent one by one at a time. For example, node
1 sends a packet to node 16, then node 2 sends the second
packet to node 14, and node 3 sends the third packet to node
15 until all packets are being sent. There are 300 packets to
send for each traffic demand and thus 900 packets in total.
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Figure 7: Network 2 with 7 Simmelian triangles.
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Figure 8: Network 3 with 3 Simmelian triangles.
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Figure 9: Network 4 with 10 Simmelian triangles and 2 structural
holes.
The packet interval is set as 3 seconds with 32 bytes data and
128ms time to live (TTL). ℎmax is set as 0.7.
There are six nodes that have been set up as source nodes
and destination nodes, so there are ten nodes left to deploy
the malicious attack in the case study. Here we assume that
these nodes are nodes 4 to 12 and node 15.
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Figure 10: Packet loss versus average clustering coefficient.
Table 1: Average clustering coefficient.
Network 1 2 3 4
Average clustering coefficient 0.53 0.37 0.14 0.54
Table 2: Packet loss and latency.
Network 1 2 3 4
Total packet loss 55 68 75 942
Average packet latency (ms) 6.23 6.42 7.25 8.84
We have deployed grey-hole attack with 50% packet
drop rate in a sensor-cloud environment. For each network
we deploy the attack on those leftover ten nodes one at a
time. This means that there are ten attack scenarios for each
network.
As we can see in Figure 10 and Table 2, the same trust-
based routing algorithm achieved the lowest total number of
packets lost regarding the all ten attack scenarios. According
to the average clustering coefficient number for each network
in Figure 10 and Table 1, network 1 has the second highest
coefficient out of four networks, followed by network 2, and
network 3 is smallest. These are supporting our first assump-
tion that the Simmelian tie has positive impact on fostering
trustworthiness by achieving the lower packet loss under
malicious attacks. Moreover, as the number of Simmelian
ties increases, the average packet latency is decreasing which
means a shorter distance to the destination node. As more
Simmelian ties also means more alternative routes and the
routing algorithm has more chance to find a short route
to destination. Moreover, the reason for less packet loss in
more Simmelian triangles network is that the Simmelian ties
effectively enforce the reputation (i.e., indirect trust) share
among the nodes within triangle which can identify the
malicious behaviors earlier and quicker to avoid, so they can
be avoided earlier to have less packet loss. For example, we
deploy the grey-hole attack on node 10 in network 3; it takes
9 packets’ loss to identify that node 10 is acting maliciously
and start avoiding it, but in network 1 it only takes 5 packets’
loss time to detect that node 10 is malicious. This is because
the neighbor sooner has negative opinion on node 10 (low
indirect trust value) and informs other nodes.
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However in network 4 with the highest average clustering
coefficient a huge amount of packet loss occurs in total among
ten attack scenarios. Though it has the largest number of
Simmelian ties, more significantly, it also has two structural
holes in the network which is the main reason causing the
huge packet loss. When we deploy the attacks on node 6
or node 10 which are the structural hole positions in the
network, although the trust routing algorithm has detected
the malicious behavior on these two nodes, an alternative
route did not exist to avoid the attacks, so still a huge
amount of packet loss occurs. This validates our second
hypothesis that the structural hole characterized network has
heavy negative impact on trustworthiness and degrades the
effectiveness of Simmelian ties. Here it is worth highlighting
that the node located in the structure hole usually has more
attractiveness to be attacked from outsiders because of its
significant impact on the network performance like in the
above case. In addition to this situation, the structure hole
can also provide the node itself with a fearless opportunity
to act unethically toward all other nodes without fear of
the other nodes’ learning about its misbehavior as explained
above about the high packet loss and being helpless to
find an alternative path to avoid this malicious node. Being
positioned in structure hole, the node becomes a gatekeeper
of information that might otherwise be transmitted between
contacts. The node spanning structural hole may have great
opportunity to hold or distort the critical information, that
is, grey-hole attack or even terminating all the information
flows, that is, black-hole attack, that pass through each party.
Secondly, taking network 4 as an example, we have
calculated the effective size for all nodes, and their values are
shown as Table 3.
It can be seen that the two structural hole nodes are nodes
6 and 10, but the node with the highest value of effective size
is node 11 rather than nodes 6 or 10. Node 10 is the second
large one. It is interesting to confirm again that the metric
of effective size is not very effective, as reported in other
literatures such as [34], to identify all the nodes located in the
structural hole. This raises a new direction to discover more
finer and effective metric for future work.
In addition, we conclude that the structural hole char-
acterized network also has significant negative impact on
Simmelian tie characterized network. Although network 4
has the largest number of Simmelian ties, the existence of
two structural hole has significantly weakened or even totally
disabled the positive effect of Simmelian ties on forming the
overall trustworthiness through the network, and we need to
consider both characteristics of Simmelian ties and structure
holes to evaluate the overall network trustworthiness.
5.2. Second Case Study. In the second case study, we set up
five network scenarios with the same number of nodes (i.e.,
16 nodes) and their locations in the network. Rather than
having the same number of connection links like the previous
case, we gradually increase the connectivity, by adding 4 links
each time, to the first benchmark network 𝐴 with 18 links in
Figure 11. All the other derivational network topologies are
shown in Figures 12–15.The rest of the simulation parameters
set up is as same as the first case study. There are a total of
Table 3: Effective size of nodes in network 4.
Nodes 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 15
Effective size 2.5 2.5 3 1 2.3 3.8 3.8 4.7 1.7 1.7
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Figure 11: Network 𝐴 with 18 links and no Simmelian triangle.
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Figure 12: Network 𝐵 with 22 links and 1 Simmelian triangle.
900 packets to send from node 1 to node 16, node 2 to node
14, and node 3 to node 13, of which 300 packets are for each
traffic flow.The grey-hole attack is deployed on nodes 4 to 12
and node 15 in each network case with 50% packet drop rate.
It can be seen that, from Figures 11–15 with the same
number of nodes and their locations, the links are gradually
being added and also the number of Simmelian increases
from 0 to 19 where every node is embedded in at least two
Simmelian triangles. Then the average clustering coefficient
and network performance are summarized in Figure 16 and
Table 4.
We can see that network 𝐶 has the highest average
clustering coefficient among the five networks, but the best
network structure, in terms of overall trustworthiness and
network performance, is network 𝐸 with the similar lowest
packet loss to network 𝐷 and lowest average packet latency.
Network 𝐸 has the highest number of Simmelian triangles
which are distributed evenly to cover the whole network
to make it best structured. Although network 𝐶 has much
less links to connect all the nodes it still enables nodes 4,
7, 8, and 12 forming the most essential Simmelian triangles
within these limited links. From this fluctuation of the
clustering coefficient values, we can see that the average
clustering coefficient is more accurate to measure the density
difference of Simmelian triangles, for example, in first case
study, regarding the various networks with similar numbers
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Figure 13: Network 𝐶 with 26 links and 9 Simmelian triangles.
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Figure 14: Network 𝐷 with 30 links and 13 Simmelian triangles.
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Figure 15: Network 𝐸 with 34 links and 19 Simmelian triangles.
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Figure 16: Packet loss versus average clustering coefficient.
Table 4: Packet loss and latency.
Network 𝐴 𝐵 𝐶 𝐷 𝐸
Average clustering coefficient 0 0.03 0.55 0.47 0.53
Total packet loss 1760 141 99 64 65
Average packet latency (ms) 36.08 8.28 6.5 6.46 5.86
of nodes and links, but it is not that effective to measure the
various networks with different number of links such as in
this case.
Moreover, once again it can be seen that, as more and
more Simmelian triangles increase in the network, the same
trust-based routing algorithm can perform better and better
to detect then avoid any malicious attack in terms of packet
loss and packet detour latency. More Simmelian triangles
embedded means more backup routes to be selected and
more possible expressing warning messages, that is, indirect
trust and reputation value collected from other neighbors
so as to detect the malicious nodes. Network 𝐴 with no
Simmelian triangle significantly constrains the trust-based
routing algorithm to find the trustable end-to-end pathwhich
causes a huge amount of packet loss and latency under
malicious attack. Network 𝐴 only has 18 links for 16 nodes
that every node only has 2 connections on average. Once
malicious attack occurs, most likely there would be only
one route choice left to detour all the traffic flows. Another
critical reason for the huge packet loss and latency is that
all the detoured traffic flows will overload and congest the
only leftover node or link to be routed which contributes
more packet loss and latency worsening the case caused by
the primary malicious attacks. In addition, the traffic flow
needs to be detoured by using longer path to reach the
destination and this contributes extra hop count to the high
average packet latency. As the links increase, the number
of alternative routes is increasing as well. The trust-based
routing algorithm has more options to be selected, so it can
workmore effectively in terms of finding better trustable end-
to-end routes. This is well confirmed by the results listed
in Table 4; the packet loss decreases as the connection links
increase, and the packet latency is decreasing as the shorter
route is available to be used as well.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we have studied how the underlying topology
can impact the overlay trust and reputation evaluation behav-
ior in sensor-cloud networks, specially how the Simmelian tie
and structural hole play roles in establishing the trustworthi-
ness among the nodes.We have piloted the average clustering
coefficient metric to calculate the percentage of Simmelian
triangle and then study the trust evaluation behavior by using
a trust-based routing algorithm to implement end-to-end
packet forwarding application in the sensor-cloud networks.
The extensive studies have confirmed that the Simmelian
tie characterized network structure has positive impact on
frosting the trustworthiness, but the structural hole char-
acterized network structure has high risk opportunities for
misbehavior and malicious attacks. Moreover, Simmelian tie
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and structural hole have an opposite structural feature in the
network, and the structural hole can have negative impact
on the advantage created by Simmelian tie characterized
network as well.
In addition, more Simmelian triangles in the network can
enable the same trust-based routing algorithm to perform
more effectively. Furthermore, the average clustering coeffi-
cient can describe the finer structure difference regarding the
networks with the same number of links and nodes.
The effective size metric cannot identify the structural
hole in the network effectively in our simulation; we are
discovering other better metrics or propose new metric so
as to identify the structural hole in the future work. We
have started looking at the betweenness metric in our second
case study, and we found that the node in the network
with higher betweenness value is more likely in a structure
hole like position and can create more damage when it
has misbehavior or is being attacked. We believe that the
current work is thought-provoking, and there are more
studies underway.
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